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MAKING PROGRESS THE OLD-FASHIONED WAY
STEPHEN B. BURBANK

It has been my pleasure to help the editors of the Law Review put
together this set of tributes to a remarkable judge, and it is my
privilege to add a brief introduction. Mine is the easy task, not only
because I am standing on the shoulders of a distinguished group of
thoughtful commentators, but because, as their assessments of the
legal contributions of the judge consistently reveal, the qualities and
hence the greatness of the judge are inseparable from the qualities of
the man. Mining their contributions unearths the same bedrock,
which, when assayed, tells us as much about the man as it does about
the judge.
In a paper written for an interdisciplinary conference on judicial
independence held at the Law School at the end of March, my
colleague, Geoffrey Hazard, concluded:
If we assume that judges cannot and should not "simply interpret" the
law, then there is an inherent limit to the ideal ofjudicial independence.
In that light, the important question is what else should be looked for in
judges beyond technical proficiency, and what should be the mixture of
technical proficiency and these other qualities. Benjamin Cardozo in his

lectures on The Nature of the JudicialProcessset forth as explicit an answer
to that question as we have had. And yet Cardozo's explication is
Delphic. Perhaps we can do no better.!
It is thus fitting that, while some of the contributors to this
seeking
festschrift have explicitly invoked the model of CardozoS when
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of
them
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Ed
Becker
that
make
qualities
to convey the
have invoked that model, explicitly or implicitly, in describing the
3
qualities that thejudge shares with the man.

t David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Judicial Independence: A Structure for Analysis 10
(Dec. 21, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
L See Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Keeping the Reformist Spirit Alive in Evidence Law,
149 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1277, 1286, 1292 (2001).
i See Marci A. Hamilton, ChiefJudgeEdward R. Becker: A Truly RemarkableJudge, 149
U. PA. L. REv. 1237, 1238 (2001) (commending the judge as "a man of great
judgment, integrity, and high moral -alues"); Richard L. Marcus, The Agenda-Setterfor
Coimplex Litigation, 149 U. P,,. L. REv'. 1257, 1273 (2001) (describing Judge Becker as
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"Technical proficiency" is an old-fashioned virtue whose purchase
is on the wane in academic circles and, I fear, among judges.
Brilliance does not require, and may in fact appear to be hindered by,
technical proficiency, if by that we mean thorough understanding,
and careful attention to the details, of existing legal doctrine.' For as
Holmes famously observed, "Ignorance is the best of law reformers.
People are glad to discuss a question on general principles, when they
have forgotten the special knowledge necessary for technical
reasoning."' Today we might say that Holmes was being charitable,
since he assumed that those who insist on "discuss[ing] a question on
general principles" once had "the special knowledge necessary for
technical reasoning."
The reader of these tributes to Judge Becker's judicial work
product emerges with no doubt that the judge possesses technical
proficiency, or that he demands the same of those who are fortunate
enough to spend a year with him repairing the gaps in their formal
legal education
Possessing high intelligence, extraordinary energy,
and unbounded intellectual curiosity, Judge Becker adds to those
qualities both fascination and patience with the complexities of legal
doctrine and willingness, at the end of the day, to abide the mistakes
and limitations of authorities he is pledged to respect. Some of these
qualities, of course, well describe judges quite different from Ed
Becker. The first three are a rare combination in any judge. Yet, I
believe, it is those added values of fascination, patience, and,
ultimately, humility, that enable him to fructify his technical
proficiency, helping to explain "the astonishing breadth, depth, and
influence of his work."

"uniquely honest, energetic, and persistent in search of sensible solutions"); Saltzburg
et al., supra note 2, at 1292 (noting the judge's "'wisdom and discretion'") (footnote
omitted).
4 See Daniel A. Farber, The CaseAgainst Brilliance 70 MINN.
L. REV. 917 (1986).
5 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881).
6 I use "Judge" rather than "Chief Judge" in the text because this Introduction
focuses, as do the individual tributes, on Ed Becker's judicial work. But see infra note
12. A separate appreciation could and some day should be written about his
contributions as an administrator. When it is, I expect that many of the same qualities
identified here as causal in the persuasiveness and influence of his judicial work will
surface again. So, I expect, will his talent at the piano. See David H. Souter, Tribute to
the HonorableEdwardK? Becker, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1229 (2001).

7 For that alone, Yale University, from which Judge Becker received
an LL.B. in
1957, should award him an honorary degree.
8 Marcus, supra note 3, at 1273.
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In another paper for the recent interdisciplinary conference on
judicial independence, another of my colleagues, Kim Lane
Scheppele, made the arresting assertion "that a judge bound by
statute and a judge bound by the dictates of a party official are
different more in degree than in kind."" Her point is akin to that
made by Professor Hazard, namely that "there is much to be said for a
judiciary that is not constituted of legal technicians indifferent to the
practical consequences of their decisions."' Equally, however, there is
much to be said for a judiciary whose members start from a platform
of, and appreciate the contributions that can flow from, technical
proficiency. From that perspective, there is reason for concern that
Judge Becker is a member of a dying breed.
The problem starts with, although it is not confined to, formal
legal education, which is increasingly provided by those whose utility
functions may place brilliance ahead of technical proficiency in their
own work and who may in any event owe their primary allegiance to
disciplines other than law. If, as Judge Becker's career on both the
trial and appellate bench suggests, technical proficiency requires hard
work, patience, and thoroughness-in a common law system, the
handmaidens of the inductive method-the path for a new judge
inclined to follow in his footsteps is steeper and littered with more
obstacles than it was forJudge Becker. Many federal trial judges today
have far more cases to resolve than did District Judge Becker in the
1970s, and the workload of a member of a United States Court of
Appeals is far heavier today than it was when Judge Becker ascended
to the Third Circuit in 1982. The pressures to avoid the hard and
time-consuming work of traditional adjudication at both levels,
whether by settlement in the trial court" or by dispensing with oral
" Kim Lane Scheppele, Courts Under Pressure: Some Observations on
Judicial
Independence 1 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file ith author) (footnote
omitted).
But in the stark posithism of soviet-style law where most cases were decided,
rules possessed simply no room for interpretation; law was applied rigidly and
ithout regard to the softening circumstances of specific cases. Insofar as
Noviet-style judges were compromised in their independence, it seemed to me
that it was far more by positivism than by being instructed what to do in the

concrete case as a routine matter.
Id. at 3.
Hazard, supra note 1, at 9.
Of course, "encouraging" settlement is not the only way a trial judge can seek to
avoid the hard and time-consuming work that adjudication requires. Ajudge may also
do that by refusing to take seriously a serious motion for summary judgment, an
attitude presumably encouraged by the judge's lack of confidence in her technical
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argument and using an alternative to published opinions in a court of
appeals,12 have increased during the thirty years since the judge was
sworn in. Some of the less-noticed costs of this transformation may be
further erosion in the capacity for technical proficiency of our judges
and, in any event, further erosion of attributes that distinguish the
judicial process from other processes of authority, including the
political process. Either would represent a threat to goals that we seek
to achieve through judicial independence.
Judge Becker, formerly counsel to the Philadelphia Republican
City Committee, is proof that politics need not be the enemy either of
judicial independence or of judicial distinction. In this, too, he may
be a member of a dying breed. For technical proficiency is a fortuity
among judges selected, by whatever appointive or elective system, for
their ideology' 3 or their willingness to trim their judicial sails to the
prevailing winds of interest group politics. With the agenda thus
narrowed, so also is the concept of progress, and in the absence of
either brilliance or technical proficiency, durable progress may in an),
event be out of reach.
The future looks even darker, and the example of Ed Becker
more luminous, when one realizes that, far from a neutral force in his
judicial career, politics has been central to his enormous
contributions. Fifteen years ago, "law is nothing more than politics"
was a common refrain in law schools, and that view remains a staple of
political science studies of judicial behavior. For Ed Becker, the
refrain is not a counsel of despair because, for him, law is equally
nothing less than politics: the art of seeking to improve the human
condition through intelligence, patience, persuasion, and
proficiency. As Professor Marcus's discussion ofJudge Becker's work in the Japanes;e
Electronics Antitrust Litigation suggests, he made a consequential contribution to the
restoration of summary judgment to respectability. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 1265.
Unfortunately, his example in that case would be very difficult for most federal trial
judges to follow, if only for lack of time.
12 Bucking this trend, shortly after assuming his current position, Chief
Judge
Becker urged his colleagues to change their judgment order practices. Subsequently,
judgment orders as a means of disposition by his court declined precipitously.
Telephone Interview with Toby D. Slawsky, Third Circuit Executive (Mar. 21, 2001).
A judge's political beliefs, his or her policy preferences, should not cause
concern unless they hold sway with such power as to be impervious to
adjudicative facts, competing policies, or the governing law as it is generally
understood. When an indidual's belief system about social needs or
aspirations is that powerful, it seems fair to speak of ideology. And on this
understanding, ideology is revealed as the enemy ofjudicial independence.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideolog,

in the Work ofJack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1971, 1999 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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compromise. Whether or not technical competence is a necessary
condition for durable, judicially fashioned progress, it surely is not a
sufficient condition. And what room is there in tomorrow's politics
for patience, for persuasion, or for compromise?
Ed Becker knows that he lives in an imperfect world and that he is
a member of an imperfect profession. Because he has made so many
contributions to the betterment of the human condition, as citizen,
lawyer, and judge, his faith that others, trained as he was and sharing
his basic commitments, can do the same is not about to yield to
momentary fits of cynicism or the eternity of ideology. In celebrating
his accomplishments we not only honor him but share with others
reason to hope that his faith is justified.
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